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If the plaintiff may, as in this case, run through the length of three con-
tracts, he may run through any number or series of them; and the most
alarming consequences would follow the adoption of such a principle. For
example, every one of the sufferers by such an accident as that which re-
cently happened on the Versailles railway might have his action against
the manufacturer of the defective axle.-Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. &
W. 109, 111, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (1842) (Byles, counsel for defendant).
As always, I take the state of the art for granted. As always, what I have
to offer is the neglected obvious.-K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradi-
tion 519 (1960).
I. INTRODUCTION
HE SPECTER raised by counsel Byles in te famous "non-
products" liability case of Winterbottom v. Wright,' has come
to haunt his brothers and sisters in the defense in the past fifteen
*Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.S., Loyola University of
Chicago; J.D., DePaul University; LL.M., New York University.
1. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). This is the decision requiring
privity of contract as an absolute sine qua non for an action in tort against a manu-
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years. The citadel of privity has long since fallen, leaving in its
place the still vibrant concept of strict liability.2 The rapid expan-
sion of this concept has resulted in confusion and concern among
both the practicing bar and legal educators about the issues of profes-
sional craftmanship and the limits of responsible adjudication in this
field. The pages of law reviews and bar journals are filled with ar-
ticles either decrying the murky state of affairs in the field,' offering
practical suggestions to the neophyte on either side of the issue,4 or
calling for the cessation of the wave of judicial opinions which al-
legedly impose haphazard and irresponsible quality control measures
on American manufacturers.'
It is the author's contention that a substantial portion of the con-
temporary confusion, both as to the scope of strict liability for prod-
ucts and the appropriate professional response to it, is the result of
both court and counsel still seeking solace in the language structure
of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts6 as a guide
facturer. The "citadel" of privity enunciated in this case stood its ground until Car-
dozo's equally famous decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. See, e.g., PROSSER, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960);
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways
and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363
(1965); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973); Holford,
The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 42 TEXAS L.
REV. 81 (1973); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An In-
teraction of Law and Technology, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 425 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Weinstein].
4. See, e.g., Coccia, Your Product Is Defendable, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 130
(1973); Kissel, Defense to Strict Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 450 (1972); Martenson, Prac-
tical and Legal Aspects of Products Liability Defense, 35 ALA. LAW. 440 (1974);
Reitz & Seabolt, Warranties and Products Liability: Who Can Sue and Where, 46
TEMP. L.Q. 527 (1973); Tobin, How To Put It Together in the Courtroom, 39
INS. COUNSEL J. 490 (1972); Note, Products Liability: Methods of Pleading and
Proof for the Plaintiff, 49 N.D. L. REv. 105 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort,
81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972), for an interesting conceptual model which, in the authors'
opinion, protects the interests of all parties concerned. See also, Henderson, supra
note 3, and the series of excellent commentaries in the article by Weinstein, supra
note 3, which criticize the current method from a variety of practical and theoretical
positions.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section is the law
for strict liability for products in virtually all jurisdictions in the United States.
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to decision while using the philosophy of strict liability for products
as the motive force for the doctrine's steady expansion. This type
of phenomenon is not, however, of recent vintage. It is partially
the result of a continuing feature of common law jurisprudence
whenever rapid changes are judicially fostered in a new area of law.
That feature is the overlooking of the way in which language is used,
both as an expressive and dynamic tool in the systemization, de-
velopment and utilization of a revolutionary legal idea.
Professor Leon Green aptly stated the proposition nearly fifty
years ago:
Under whatever guise it has been undertaken, the search for a language
technic which would solve the difficulties of government has been the
falsest hope of legal scholarship. . . . It is not that a scientific language
device is not desirable. It is merely that too much emphasis has been put
upon it, and too much expected of it. The attempt has been made and still
is made to make language do the service of judging itself.7
In addition to the undue emphasis traditionally placed on the verbali-
zation of a legal idea, lawyers, in the face of tremendous demands
on their time and energy, have also tended to overlook certain basic
aspects of the common law decision-making process itself.8 The
combination of these two historical facts in the context of a rapid
development in any area of law, can result in confusion and profes-
sional cynicism.
An analysis of these two factors in relation to contemporary con-
cern over the chaotic rise of products liability law over the past one
and a half decades will be the central concern of this Article. Sev-
eral germinal ideas set forth by Professor Karl Llewellyn in his mas-
ter work The Common Law Tradition9 will be addressed first, fol-
lowed by a brief exposition of this author's view of several problems
associated with the evolution of legal language technic. These two
in turn will serve as the context for an analysis of the development
and current use of several key areas of Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. The final section will scrutinize a ground-
breaking products liability decision, Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Ne-
7. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014,
1018 (1928) (emphasis added).
8. See note 19 infra.
9. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960) [hereinafter cited as
THE COMMON LAW TnDrrON].
[Vol. 24:914
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mours & Co.,'0 as illustrative of the positions taken in the preceding
discussion.
11. CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE
If there had been any ground for such an action, there certainly would have
been some precedent of it; but with the exception of actions against inn-
keepers, and some few other persons, no case of a similar nature has oc-
curred in practice. That is a strong circumstance, and is of itself great au-
thority against its maintenance.-Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109,
114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404 (1842) (Lord Abinger, C.B.).
Historically, whenever lawyers using the tools of their craft are
nevertheless unable to predict with any degree of accuracy the range
of probable results of cases requiring an appeal, a "crisis of confi-
dence" and attendant professional cynicism are the result." Profes-
sor Karl Llewellyn stated in the preface to The Common Law Tra-
dition,12 published fifteen years ago, that his purpose in writing the
book was to resolve the current "crisis of confidence" among mem-
bers of the bar regarding the "reckonability" of the state appellate
decision-making process.' 3  This "crisis of confidence" was seen as
having pervasive effects:
In most it no longer inspires healthy reaction to effect its cure; for most it
has come to lay a pall and palsy on heart and hand because it goes to
whether there is any reckonability in the work of our appellate courts, any
real stability of footing for the lawyer, be it in appellate litigation or coun-
seling, whether therefore there is any effective craftsmanship for him to
bring to bear to serve his client and justify his being.14
A major reason for this professional malaise, according to Llewellyn,
10. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
11. In THE COMMON LAW TRADrrION, supra note 9, Llewellyn states:
Of course, ever since lawyers began to lawyer, there have been losing coun-
sel a plenty who have so believed in their causes that they have bitterly
blamed the court. . . . Despite all this, the bar is bothered these days with
a bother which has a new corrosiveness.
Id. at 3.
12. THE COMMON LAW TRADION, supra note 9.
13. This book starts with the fact that the bar is bothered by our appellate
courts-not the much discussed Supreme Court alone, but our appellate
courts in general. The bar is so much bothered about these courts that we
face a crisis in confidence which packs danger.
Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 3-4.
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was a shift in the style in which modem appellate decisions are
rendered.15
Llewellyn describes the current model, labeled the "Grand
Style," as less rigid in the use of precedent generally, more infused
with broad principle and reason as the decisional fulcrum, and ex-
tremely adept at the distinguishment or chipping away of bother-
some or outdated precedent. 6 As a result of courts imperceptibly
shifting over the years from the "Formal Style," i.e., traditional, prec-
edent oriented, the bar feels frustrated, inadept and hostile. 1 7 This
"crisis of confidence" accordingly is the result of lawyers' loss of faith
in their ability to responsibly utilize the tools of their craft on a cli-
ent's behalf.
Likewise, a similar crisis has developed in current attempts by
counsel to fathom the currents of modem appellate decisions in the
products liability field. As will be discussed, the inherent frailty of
the language structure of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts' s stems from the courts' overriding emphasis on the philoso-
15. W. TWINING, in his book KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
(1973), stated:
Llewellyn's importation of the concept of style into jurisprudential analysis
is a good example of his flair for drawing attention to "the neglected ob-
vious." Judicial opinions can be extraordinarily varied in respect of length,
explicitness, individuality, the nature and range of source materials relied
on, the manner of handling such materials, the modes of reasoning, and so
on. "Style" is a useful generic term encompassing such characteristics of
a series of opinions as may be considered to be distinctive . . . . In
Llewellyn's usage the term refers to the manner of thought exhibited in ju-
dicial opinions rather than to their literary style, in so far as these are dis-
tinguishable.
Id. at 210.
16. In extremely rough form, Llewellyn posted at least sixty-four techniques for
dealing with precedent. THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 9, at 77-91. He
was satisfied more by general acceptance of the multiplicity of techniques than by
his ability to describe them more precisely:
The following classification of standard techniques is roughhewn. It is
above all incomplete. The finer shadings are hard to communicate, perhaps
hard to agree upon, and the going diversity even of the coarser approaches
is too large to warrant the effort needed to exhaust it. It is enough if one
can demonstrate a true multiplicity.
Id. at 76.
17. Id. at 4:
You cannot listen to the dirges of lawyers about the death of stare decisis
(of the nature of which lovely institution the dirgechanters have little
inkling) without realizing that one great group at the bar are close to losing
their faith.
18. See discussion at p. 924 et seq. infra.
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phy of strict liability for products. An additional factor contributing
to this dilemma is that the entire field has developed and is continu-
ing to do so pursuant to "Grand Style" models of adjudication.
The great bulk of The Common Law Tradition is devoted to an
examination and elucidation of the two "styles" by way of close an-
alysis of blocks of decided opinions. This analysis is effected in the
context of an overall structural study of fourteen "steadying fac-
tors"'-which Llewellyn felt insured "reckonability" and thereby
resolved the false dilemma of contemporary practitioners. It is be-
yond the scope of this Article to systematically analyze a series of
products liability cases within Llewellyn's analytical model. Rather,
by keeping at the forefront the premises just stated and stressing
the "neglected obvious"2 in the development and current use of the
language technic of Section 402A, it is hoped that a clearer picture,
if not a resolution of the current "crisis of confidence" in the prod-
ucts liability field, may emerge.
This major book by Karl Llewellyn has been aptly described as
"Gothic.' It is also exasperating and at times stylistically anarchic.
The fact remains that, to date, it is probably one of the most percep-
19. In appellate judicial deciding we have, materially steadying the activity
and its results, at least those lines of factor which follow. . . . (1) Law-
conditioned Officials, (2) Legal Doctrine, (3) Known Doctrinal Tech-
niques, (4) Responsibility for Justice, (5) The Tradition of One Single
Right Answer, (6) An Opinion of the Court, (7) A Frozen Record from
Below, (8) Issues Limited, Sharpened, Phrased, (9) Adversary Argument
by Counsel, (10) Group Decision, (11) Judicial Security and Honesty,
(12) A Known Bench, (13) The General Period-Style and Its Promise,
(14) Professional Judicial Office.
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 9, at 19.
20. See discussion at p. 924 et seq. infra.
21. As noted by Professor William Twining in his masterful study of Llewellyn's
book:
The critic is beset by conflicting impressions: . . . a thesis of classic sim-
plicity elaborated in a Gothic structure. . . ideas worked over and polished
for more than thirty years presented as a rude elementary analysis. The
principal addressee is the ordinary practitioner, yet the Teutonic thorough-
ness of the documentation wearies all but the most patient scholar;
empirical methods, idiosyncratically "scientific," are used to verify hypoth-
eses expressed in terms which look suspiciously metaphysical; a work of
theory on the grand scale is advertised as a do-it-yourself manual for judges
and advocates; the author preaches at greatest length where he was prac-
ticed least. . . . Richly specific in illustration, insipidly vague in general
conclusion. A success and disappointment.
W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 203 (1973).
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tive and seminal treatises written on the actual workings of the com-
mon law appellate decision-making process.
III. THE NEGLECTED OBVIOUS AND STRUCTURAL
METAMORPHOSIS
Whilst the plaintiff, as such mail-coachman so hired, was driving the said
mail-coach from Hartford to Holyhead, the same coach. . . gave way and
broke down, whereby the plaintiff was thrown from his seat, and in con-
sequence of injuries then received, had become lamed for life.-Winter-
bottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 110, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (1842).
Professor Llewellyn often referred to his work as the "neglected
obvious."2  In regard to how problems are structurally resolved in
our common law system, this is still a prime factor in the dilemma
experienced by lawyers in the face of dramatic changes in a particu-
lar field of law. The "neglected obvious" in the present author's
frame of reference means, quite simply, the manner in which any
human conflict situation, including a products liability case, is struc-
turally channeled, altered, and legally characterized prior to eventual
resolution in the rare instances where litigation and subsequent ap-
peal are deemed necessary.
"Thinking like a lawyer" is an oft-heard catch-phrase containing
within it a view of the end product of legal education entertained
by the great bulk of first semester law students and perhaps the pub-
lic at large. It takes substantial time and effort to dissuade the neo-
phyte of that notion and to convince him that lawyers think like
everyone else, but are required to express their thoughts about a
matter brought to their professional attention in a highly specialized
way. 23
22. Llewellyn stated: "Mhe mere 'novelty' of the perceptions here recorded
hinders then queerly from real denting of the mind. Not that, albeit novel, they are
new. Quite the contrary. As has been shown, they are as traditional as our primeval
trees." THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 9, at 142. This brings to mind
the observation of Arthur Koestler regarding the nature of scientific discovery: "Dis-
covery often means simply the uncovering of something which has always been there
but was hidden from the eye by the blinkers of habit." A. KOESTLER, THE AcT OF
CREATION 108 (1969).
23. See, e.g., Green, The Study and Teaching of Tort Law, 34 TEXAs L. REV.
1 (1955):
Perhaps the first and possibly the most important factor in the [student-
teacher] relation is that student and teacher talk the same language, and
this will normally mean the teacher's language. But inasmuch as the
920 [Vol. 24:914
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Every human conflict situation that comes to litigation as the ap-
propriate mode of resolution is obviously infused with the philosophi-
cal, moral, social, or economic ideology of the respective litigants.
What is too often overlooked is the fact that the problem, along with
its attendant ideologies, must be set forth, clarified, refined, and le-
gally characterized within the total organizational, conceptual, and
language structures of the common law decision-making apparatus.2"
This conflict-resolution structure, from its inception, causes the un-
derlying human problem to undergo immediate alteration, the result
being the gradual metamorphosis of the human problem into a series
of legal issues.
The rules of civil practice necessitate the capsulization of the
basic facts and require the plaintiff to state how he wishes the court
or jury to officially characterize the defendant's conduct. This pre-
liminary unofficial labelling25 sets in motion the plethora of litiga-
tion-related rules which determine the manner and pace at which
the problem is to be channeled through the process to eventual reso-
lution. It is here that legal theory enters and serves as the major
catalyst in the process of structural metamorphosis.
In the event of an appeal, the encapsulation and fragmentation
of the original problem is intensified due to the general concept and
limited number of legal issues which serve as the focal point for ap-
pellate scrutiny.26  It is here, along with preliminary trial court rul-
teacher's language is at least approximately that of the profession, they both
must talk the language of the profession with the teacher's peculiar inflec-
tions. The learning to communicate in professional language is not easy;
it is the big half of legal education....
24. See, e.g., M. FRANKLIN, THE BIooRAPiHY OF A LEGAL DisPuTE (1968). Leon
Green expressed the idea as follows:
Thus facts, policies, and doctrine accepted as basis for judgment are colored
by the desires of the people who have a part in a litigation. The litigation
process can do little more than neutralize the deep colors given by the
parties by the softer colors supplied by jurors and judges.
Green, Tort Law Public Law In Disguise (11), 38 THxAs L. REv. 257, 264 (1960).
25. The power of such unofficial characterizations serves as the basis for negotia-
tion and settlement and as such is vital to the smooth functioning of any legal system.
That particular aspect of social control through law is the neglected area of juris-
prudence. See, e.g., K. OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT (2d ed. 1971).
26. The ultimate matter . . . which come[s] before the appellate judicial
court to be decided [is] an issue already drawn, drawn by lawyers, drawn
against the background of legal doctrine and procedure, and drawn largely
in frozen, printed words. This tends powerfully both to focus and limit dis-
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ings on legal questions, that the inherent frailty of language technic
comes to the fore. Here too, Llewellyn's "steadying factor" of issues
"limited, sharpened and phrased '27 governs the development of the
rules of decision. This aspect of the structural alteration process
merits brief attention prior to a closer examination of its particular
impact in the field of products liability.
IV. THE FUNCTIONAL EVOLUTION OF LEGAL CONCEPTS
By permitting this action, we should be working this injustice, that after
the defendant had done everything to the satisfaction of his employer, and
after all matters between them had been adjusted, and all accounts settled
on the footing of their contract, we should subject them to be ripped open
by this action of tort being brought against him.-Winterbottom v. Wright,
10 M. & W. 109, 115, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842) (Lord Abinger, C.
B.).
Any rule of common law, statute, ordinance, or administrative
regulation in any area of law is the verbalization, in legal parlance,
of a conclusion as to how society views the appropriate ordering or
results of specific types of societal relationships or interactions. 28  In
order for our common law system to function, the verbalization of
a new judge-made conclusion must conform to a pattern of expres-
sion developed over the years. It must also be verbally consistent
with other tangentially related rules or conclusions which serve as
the conceptual context for the impact and dynamics of the new
idea. 29  Once such a conclusion has been initially verbalized, the
process of legal evolution is initiated.
"Legal evolution" is the gradual process of judicial refinement of
cussion, thinking, and lines of deciding.
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 9, at 29.
27. Supra, note 19.
28. Law is administered by means of countless concepts, abstractions, fic-
tions, and generalizations-language fashioned by usage of lawyers and
judges. . . . Thus the study of law is the acquisition of power-the power
to pass judgment through the use of the concepts, abstractions and fictions
which make up the language of the law.
Green, The Study and Teaching of Tort Law, supra note 23, at 17-18.
29. It is understood and accepted that the context for seeing and discussing
the question to be decided is to be set by and in a body of legal doctrine;
and that where there is no real room for doubt, that body of doctrine is
nonetheless to guide the deciding; and that even where there is deep trouble,
the deciding should strive to remain moderately consonant with the lan-
guage and also with the spirit of some part of that body of doctrine.
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 9, at 20,
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the verbalization of a new legal idea, both operationally and semanti-
cally. The original core idea ensconsed within the new rule state-
ment is honed, elucidated, and brought to its functional fruition by
way of a long series of decisions involving varied applications of the
core idea in whole or part.30
Lawyers generally consider the latest mutation in the legal evo-
lution of a particular concept to be a good in itself. They react
against any regressive tendencies exhibited by courts which attempt
a return to the simplicity of the original core idea or conclusion as
an aid to the resolution of a novel problem.3 ' This reaction, which
was Llewelyn's major concern throughout The Common Law Tradi-
tion, can be seen as being based on two related factors: the ideal
of a conceptual evolutionary process as the most desirable goal and,
more importantly, the negative effect that such regressive applica-
tions have on the understanding and use of the lawyer's craft tools.
Hence, a concomitant aspect of the process of legal evolution is
the structuring of the perimeters of the concept in the lawyer's mind,
his familiarity with the constituent elements of the idea, and his gen-
eral predictive ability regarding its overall applicability. An inter-
ference with this "reckonability" base, to use Llewellyn's terminol-
ogy, jars the inbred sense of professional craftsmanship and raises
the hue and cry of judicial gamesmanship. 2  The legal evolution
of Section 402A provides a specific case in point.
30. Llewellyn stated:
To understand, despite such now flagrant misdescription, the stubborn grip
of the formula on men's minds, one must remember not only the lasting
validity of the ideal expressed, but the tradition, the long tradition in which
the same words had been a workably accurate depiction, and had acquired
a sort of unchallengeable holiness of phrase.
Id. at 187.
31. When talking about illegitimate precedent techniques, Llewellyn stated:
When the fair-even the strained-meaning of an authority is distorted into
nonrecognizability, the immediate effect on the detail of doctrine is confu-
sion ....
But whether the distortion be planned or sloppy, and regardless of the
particular point, such distortion in any case opens to every attentive lawyer
the peril that in any other case at all the like may be visited upon any au-
thority at all; few situations present more dramatically Bentham's "second
order" of harm from an offense: the rush, through a multitude, of in-
security and fear in matters of vital moment.
Id. at 134.
32. Today all of this is so familiar and obvious as to bore, but there were
reasons why, four or five decades ago, it shocked our legal world. The in-
19751
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V. THE LEGAL EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF STRICT
LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS
If we were to hold that the plaintiff could sue in such a case, there is no
point at which such actions would stop. The only safe rule is to confine the
right to recover to those who enter into the contract: if we go one step be-
yond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty.-Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 115, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842) (Alderson,
B.).
Any idea that has been in the world for twenty years and has not per-
ished has become a platitude although it was a revelation twenty years ago.
One might venture on the paradox that by the time a proposition becomes
generally articulate it ceases to be true-because things change about as fast
as they are realized.3 3
This cogent observation of Justice Holmes about the development
of legal concepts generally has special relevance to the articulation
of the idea of strict liability for products via Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts 4 and its legal evolutionary de-
velopment.
In 1961, the authors of Tentative Draft No. 6 of the Second Re-
statement offered Section 402A as exemplifying the most compre-
hensive verbalization of the philosophy of strict liability for products
as delineated in a series of cases over the preceding three decades.
The section was limited however to food products only:
Section 402A. Special Liability of Sellers of Food
One engaged in the Business of Selling Food for Human Consumption
Who Sells Such Food in a Defective Condition Unreasonably Dangerous to
the Consumer Is Subject to Liability For Bodily Harm Thereby Caused to
One Who Consumes It, Even Though
grained practice of that time was to write an appellate opinion as if the
conclusion had followed of necessity from the authorities at hand and as
if it had been the only possible correct conclusion. Accept those premises,
and a "well-reasoned" opinion not only shows why the decision is wise and
right, but would also show the process by which the decision was arrived
at. Men liked that. . . . Now these psychologists were insisting that that
was not so at all--except of course by accident or on very occasional occa-
sion [sic]. It is not hard to see why they, along with those men of law
who adopted and adapted their insight, looked challenging, seemed like at-
tackers and destroyers.
Id. at 11.
33. HOLMES, Introduction to RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INsTrTUTIONS at xxx
(1923), as cited in Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, supra note 7, at
1019 n. 19.
34. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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(a) The Seller Has Exercised All Possible Care in The Preparation and
Sale of the Food, and
(b) The Consumer Has Not Bought The Food From or Entered Into
Any Contractual Relation with The Seller.3 5
At that time, one year after the publication of The Common Law
Tradition, the reporters noted that nineteen jurisdictions had ac-
cepted the idea of strict liability for food products without statute
and five more by way of enactment. Fourteen appeared equivocal,
while fourteen more had expressly rejected the idea. 6 Due to the
obvious lack of unanimity, the following caveat was stated:
The Institute expresses no opinion whether the rule stated in this section
may not apply
(1) to articles other than food, or
(2) to harm other than bodily harm, or
(3) to harm to persons other than consumers, or caused otherwise than by
consumption.8 7
It was emphasized, however, that the past year had witnessed a
"spectacular eruption" of cases extending the idea to non-food prod-
ucts, 38 a state of affairs deemed likely to continue. 9 In addition
to the lack of clear judicial support or guidelines, a major hurdle
at this preliminary stage was the appropriate verbalization of the core
idea of strict liability for products:
How should the Section be stated? After stating no less than twenty-nine
possibile theories, most with an element of fiction, such as third party bene-
ficiary contracts, agencies to buy or sell, or offers to the consumer accepted
by his purchase, the courts now are in general agreement on the theory...
of a warranty running with the goods .... 40
The massive conceptual confusion 41 over the years as to the theo-
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
36. Id. at 24-28.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
38. The groundbreaking decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) had been published,
along with several others containing strong dictum for the global application of the
strict liability concept. See, e.g., Beck v. Spindler, 99 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. 1959).
39. "It is evident that the probable development of the law will carry the strict
liability to many products other than food. There is still great uncertainty as to
whether there are any limits, and if so what." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
Explanatory Notes § 402A, at 31 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
40. Id. at 32.
41. In some instances this theory has proved to be an unfortunate one.
Although warranty was in its origin a matter of tort liability, and it is gen-
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retical and practical differences between implied warranty in tort and
implied warranty in contract was likely to continue and hence inter-
fere with the simplicity of the core idea. 2 This confusion and im-
pediment to development was initially set to rest by the still concep-
tually vibrant and groundbreaking decision of Justice Traynor of the
California Supreme Court two years later in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.43
Justice Traynor's opinion, anticipated by his remarks in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co.44 decided nearly two decades earlier, set the
tone for a return to the core idea of strict liability for products as
the motive force for future development. Cutting through the
thicket of warranty-generated problems created by the initial search
for a language technic, Justice Traynor put the matter simply:
We need not recanvass the reasons for imposing strict liability on the
manufacturer. . . . The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufactur-
ers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves. Sales warranties serve this pur-
pose fitfully at best. 45
Accordingly, the following verbalization of the philosophy of strict
liability was set forth: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when
an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
erally agreed that a tort action will still be for its breach, it has become
so identified in practice with a contract of sale between the plaintiff and
the defendant that the warranty theory has become something of an obstacle
to the recognition of the strict liability where there is no such contract.
Id. at 38.
42. "It is much simpler to regard the liability here stated as merely one of strict
liability in tort." Id. at 39.
43. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
44. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion):
[Blut I believe the manufacturers' negligence should no longer be singled
out as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like the present one.
In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an
absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to human beings.
45. 59 Cal. 2d at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (emphasis added).
This is historically ironic in the sense that Chief Justice Shaw in the famous case
of Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850), referred to the centuries old
distinction between trespass and trespass on the case as mere "dicta" in the course
of launching the idea of no liability without fault on the American continent.
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injury to a human being." '4  This statement (or restatement) of the
core idea of strict liability for products was the catalyst for the rapid
application of the doctrine to virtually every significant party tradi-
tionally associated with the vertical chain of the American manufac-
turing and marketing process.
The general influence of the decision and Justice Traynor's work
with Professor Prosser, who was the reporter for the Second Restate-
ment's Committee re-drafting Section 402A, resulted three years
later in the publication of the final draft of the version currently in
use.47 Section 402A, which is now the language technic in virtually
every jurisdiction in the United States, provides as follows:
SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PRODUCT FOR
PHYSICAL HARM TO USER OR CONSUMER
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.48
Since its publication in final form in 1965, the legal evolution of
Section 402A has been rapid and dramatic. This leaps and bounds
application of the core idea of strict liability pursuant to the language
technic of Section 402A has, in the author's opinion, resulted in the
initial confusion fostered by the "warranty" cases returning full circle
in 1975. The virtual en masse agreement that the Section is the
most appropriate verbalization of the core idea of strict liability, once
the more obvious applications have been made as to parties,4 9 has
run head on with the increased willingness of courts to expand the
46. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
47. See, Maslow, Products Liability Comes of Age, 5 Jusus DOCTOR 26, 30-31
(1975).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
49. I.e., to manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors and retailers.
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application of the concept of "seller" to additional parties in the
American business scene."
The consistent use over the past decade of the language technic
of Section 402A has, as with the legal evolution of any idea, refined
its more obvious overall applicability and the specific applicability
of its constituent elements to real life situations. Likewise, the
process has built up the aforementioned professional "craft-tool" ex-
pectations of counsel and the concomitant "reckonability" base.51
Today, however, as litigants continue to urge the courts to further
expand the idea of strict liability for products, all parties concerned
are experiencing increasing frustration at the apparent limits set to
the task of prosecution or defense by the language technic con-
straints of Section 402A.5 2
Instead of breaking through the felt barriers to progress by a re-
statement of the core idea and thereby wreaking havoc on a substan-
tial body of professional expectations, courts are currently utilizing
more subtle language technics to cautiously accomplish the basic
task.
The inherent capability of slight shadings in the language of 402A
to accomplish grander results and the danger it portends were noted
early by cautious jurists:
The grand simplicity of the new doctrine-its sweeping aside of the con-
cept of liability through fault-is its most dangerous aspect. The all-inclu-
sive ring of "strict liability" will cause an overextension . . . of what is con-
ceived by its progenitors to be a limited concept. Unlike its predecessor-
doctrine of liability through "fault," which in the very statement of the
principle suggests that the shifting of loss is to be the exception rather than
the rule, the innuendos of the new verbiage are pervasive.53
This cautious attempt to adjust the language technic of Section
402A by returning via "reverse" legal evolution to the core idea of
50. See, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Services Corp., 45 N.J.
434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (lessors); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,
207 A.2d 314 (1965) (mass-producer of homes); Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc., 54 N.J.
585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439,
481 P.2d 924 (1971) (sales-service hybrid for hair products); Perfection Paint &
Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970).
51. See notes 11-21 and accompanying text supra.
52. See, e.g., Reno, Petition for Rehearing on Suvada and Restatement 402A, 62
ILL. B.J. 388 (1974), and articles cited in note 3 supra.
53. Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, -, 431 P.2d 108, 119
(1967) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
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strict liability for products, brings to mind the sobering caution of
Professor Leon Green:
The struggle which men are making to rise above the word level seems to
have no end .... Word ritual under one guise or another has always been
one of the primary methods of law administration, and the development of
the uses made of words is one of the most puzzling of studies. . . . No
sooner had the written word become a means of evidencing the dealings of
men in every day life than it was shackled by :all of these uses.54
At this point, several key concepts related to the language technic
of 402A will be examined to serve as examples of the contemporary
judicial efforts at adjustment in order to foster the continuing via-
bility of the core idea of strict liability. Out of a large number of
examples," the following have been selected for closer analysis: the
concept of "unreasonably dangerous" as a component part of proof
of defects, the concept of "intended use" as setting limitations on
manufacturers' liability for foreseeable risks, and the issue of the
propriety of post-occurrence change evidence. The problems cur-
rently being encountered in each of the areas stem from the conflicts
between the courts' continued faith in the efficacy of the language
technic of Section 402A and their return, by way of reverse legal
evolution, to the simplicity of the original core idea of strict liability.
A. Defective Condition Unreasonably Dangerous
There has been and continues to be a debate as to whether or
not in a design defect case,56 as opposed to a manufacturing defect
setting,5 7 the plaintiff must still, even under the conceptual canopy
of Section 402A, in fact prove a negligence case.55
54. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, supra note 7, at 1016-17.
55. See notes 91-96 infra.
56. This is the designation commonly used to classify cases where the entire line
of a product is attacked i.e. overall design, packaging, warnings or instructions.
57. Here, the allegation is that the particular unit of an acceptable line of goods
is different than the others in quality.
58. See, e.g., Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocations
of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329 (1966); Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J.
887 (1967); Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L.
REv. 325 (1971); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. (1965);
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
In the opinion of this author, if looked at from the practical trial level of what must
be done, the plaintiff must prove a negligence case.
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One of the more recent cases to enter the fray is Roach v. Ko-
nonen,59 involving an alleged defectively designed automobile hood
latch which failed and caused the hood to fly up, resulting in serious
injuries. After devoting several pages to a discussion of the obvious
distinction between a negligence and a strict liability case,60 the court
nevertheless concluded as follows:
It is generally recognized that in the vast majority of cases, the appli-
cation of either the theory of strict liability or of negligence seldom leads
to different conclusions ...
But in any case, whether a court characterizes the cause of action as
arising in negligence or strict liability, the proof of a defect which must be
marshalled in support of the plaintiff's case usually takes the same form and
usually what proves one proves the other.6 1
Nevertheless, the key phrase "unreasonably dangerous" to the user
or consumer is currently under heavy attack as being a verbal im-
pediment to the further reaches of the core idea of strict liability
for products.
The California Supreme Court, the progenitor of the core idea,
has expunged the phrase as being inconsistent with the ideational
content of Justice Traynor's opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Co. 2 In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,63 responding to allegations
of trial court error in excluding the phrase "unreasonably danger-
ous" from the instructions, the court noted the pervasive influence
of the language technic of Section 402A and that courts have "more
frequently adopted than challenged its basic outlines. 64  However,
a collision between the core idea stated in Greenman and the ver-
balization of the idea in Section 402A was inevitable:
59. - Ore. -, 525 P.2d 125 (1974).
60. The court distinguished the two as follows:
[I]t is generally recognized that the basic difference between negligence on
the one hand and strict liability for a design defect on the other, is that
in strict liability we are talking about the condition (dangerousness) of an
article which is designed in a particular way, while in negligence we are
talking about the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions in designing
and selling the article as he did.
Id. at -, 525 P.2d at 129.
61. Id. at-, 525 P.2d at 129.
62. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
63. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). The alleged defect
was the design of an aluminum safety hasp securing trays in a bakery truck.
64. Id. at 131, 501 P.2d at 1160, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 440,
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The almost inextricable intertwining of the Greenman and Restatement
standards in our jurisprudence was inevitable, considering the simplicity of
Greenman and the fuller guidance for many situations offered by the Re-
statement and its commentary. Nevertheless, the issue now raised requires
us to examine and resolve an apparent divergence in the two formula-
tions.65
The inclusion of the qualifying phrase "unreasonably dangerous"
was seen as creating a strict liability-negligence dichotomy for manu-
facturing versus design defect cases. This was seen as especially
important regarding the marshalling of proof. Wishing to avoid
"providing such a battleground for clever counsel," 66 the court con-
cluded:
[ ..To require an injured plaintiff to prove not only that the product con-
tained a defect but also that such defect made the product unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer would place a considerably greater bur-
den upon him than that articulated in Greenman. We believe that the
Greenman formulation is consistent with the rationale and development of
products liability law ... because it provides a clear and simple test for
determining whether the injured party is entitled to recovery. 67
This assault on the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" is gaining
rapid acceptance in other jurisdictions68 and is a good indicator of
the "reverse" legal evolution which is at the heart of a significant
amount of contemporary professional discontent among defense
counsel in this field. Discontent issues from the fact that lawyers
can only defend a client by the utilization of their professional tools.
When that effort proves consistently unfruitful or is seemingly under-
65. Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
66. Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
67. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443 (emphasis added).
68. See, e.g., Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973);
Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976 (Alas. 1973); Sutton v. Chev-
ron Oil Co., 85 N.M. 604, 514 P.2d 1301 (1973); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.S.
2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769 (1973); Pyatt v. Engel Equipment, Inc., 17 IlI. App. 3d
1070, 309 N.E.2d 225 (1974); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518,
317 A.2d 494 (1974); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla.
1974). See also Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., - Ore. -, 525 P.2d 1033
(1974), where the court, after noting Cronin, concluded that while the phrase was
still necessary to avoid absolute liability, it should be seen as meaning that the test
is whether the seller knew of the risk involved, not whether the expectations of the
consumer were disappointed as provided by the Restatement. This is basically the
formula suggested by Professors Wade and Keeton, see note 58 infra. Their purpose
in using this test was not to jar the "reckonability" base of the lawyer, since "it
preserves the use of familiar terms and thought processes with which courts, lawyers
and jurors customarily deal." Id. at -, 525 P.2d at 1037.
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cut by decisions such as Cronin and its progeny, which offer no prac-
tical guides to future professional work, Llewellyn's "crisis of confi-
dence" re-emerges.
In addition to jarring what is felt to be a basic conceptual under-
standing of the overall functional application of Section 402A (as
in Cronin), the courts are currently making "irreligious" uses of
tangentially related concepts traditionally understood as setting some
limits on a manufacturer's liability for harm in fact caused by the
use of their product. A prime example of this more specific type
of "reverse" legal evolution is the current judicial efforts to break
out of the conceptual straightjacket placed on the general concept
of foreseeability under Section 402A by the evolution of the idea
of "intended use."
B. The Intended Use Concept
The early development of the core idea of intended use7° was to
serve the purpose of limiting the responsibility of manufacturers to
only those injuries arising out of a range of foreseeable risks con-
comitant to the normal use of the product. This traditional majority
view was recently restated by the Illinois supreme court in Winnett
v. Winnett:71
In our judgment the liability of a manufacturer properly encompasses only
those individuals to whom injury from a defective product may reasonably
be foreseen and only those situations where the product is being used for
the purpose for which it was intended or for which it is reasonably foresee-
able that it may be used. Any other approach to the problem results in
making the manufacturer and those in the chain of product distribution vir-
tual insurers of the product .... 72
This view of the concept of intended use results in a limitation
on the more open-ended foreseeability spectrum of general negli-
69. The succeeding stages of rules and principles and doctrines, with their
formulas and standards reduced to well polished phrases, are still dominat-
ing our law. . . . To this array on theological methods we have added
classification and analysis, the deductive and inductive processes of logic.
. .. All of these have their utility, but the first requisite of intellectual
freedom, and as much so in the study of the science of law as elsewhere, is
a wholesome fear of words.
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, supra note 7, at 1017.
70. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
71. 57 Ill. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
72. Id. at 11, 310 N.E.2d at 4.
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gence law which usually only excludes from the defendant's required
consideration risks possibly foreseen or not foreseeable at all.7" In
the products liability field, risks of injury in fact perceived, whether
to a likelihood or a certainty, may nevertheless be discounted by the
manufacturer in its decision-making process if such risks are not cog-
nizable within the normal range of the intended use of the goods.
The propriety of this conceptual limitation on foreseeability has
been most vigorously debated in the so-called "second accident"
cases in the automotive field. The conflicting views of Evans v.
General Motors Corp.7 4 and Larsen v. General Motors Corp.75 raise
the question of whether the manufacturer of an automobile has any
responsibility to so design his vehicle to protect occupants from in-
creased injury or death caused by a manufacturing defect following
a collision for which the company bears no responsibility.
While the concept of negligence is technically alien to a strict lia-
bility case, it is obviously a necessary component of any analysis
seeking to determine the range of the intended use of a product.
As noted, foreseeability in fact versus foreseeability in law is the key
distinction in the use of this traditional concept in the products
field. In the years since the publication of Section 402A in the final
form, this limited foreseeability concept applicable to the "intended
use" idea has been generally accepted, even in the face of mounting
evidence of increased injury and death as a result of automobile col-
lisions.
Courts seeking to foster potential "second accident" liability have
done so by returning to the origins of the intended use formula in
line with the core idea of strict liability for products. This has been
technically accomplished by expanding the intended use doctrine to
include the idea of "environment." Because of the usefulness of
the intended use concept in most non-automobile products cases, the
return to the core idea of Greenman has been effected without purg-
73. See Turkington, Foreseeability and Duty Issues In Illinois Torts; Constitu-
tional Limitations to Defamation Suits Under Gertz, 24 DEPAuL. L. REV. 243, 253-
71 (1975). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971);
Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961); Prosser,
Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1953).
74. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966). This case takes the negative on the issue
and constitutes the majority position.
75. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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ing the concept in toto, by emphasizing that where a product is
used is as important as how it is used in determining the spectrum
of risks that must be considered by the manufacturers.
A current example of reverse legal evolution regarding this issue
is the case of Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co.,7" where the plaintiff main-
tained that Ford had a responsibility under Section 402A to design
its 1970 Maverick so that the top of the gas tank did not serve as
the floor of the trunk. In this case, the decedent, plaintiff's son, was
killed in a fire following a collision with another vehicle. After an-
alyzing both Larsen,77 which was a negligence case, and Evans,78
brought under a strict liability theory, the court stated:
A literal Evans-type interpretation of "intended use" fails to recognize that
the phrase was first employed in early products-liability cases such as
Greenman ...merely to illustrate the broader central doctrine of foresee-
ability. The phrase was not meant to preclude manufacturer's responsi-
bility for the probable ancillary consequences of normal use . . . . In-
stead, a manufacturer "must also be expected to anticipate the environment
which is normal for the use of his product and ...he must anticipate the
reasonably foreseeable risks of the use of his product in such an environ-
ment." 79
This effort, slowly gaining acceptance,"0 is a further example of
the efforts of courts to break through the shackles of language and
return to the core idea of strict liability for products. The present
analysis of the inherent frailty of the language technic of Section
402A, can be furthered by briefly examining one more general prod-
ucts liability area, the use of post-occurrence change evidence.
C. Section 402A and Post-Occurrence Change Evidence
Another heretofore sacrosanct products litigation truism, the ex-
clusion of post-occurrence change evidence in a Section 402A case,
76. 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974). This case was a diversity case interpreting
Rhode Island law.
77. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
78. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
79. 494 F.2d at 181 (emphasis added). See also Raymond v. Riegel Textile
Corp., 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973); Bremier v. Volkswagen of Amer., Inc., 340
F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064
(E.D. Pa. 1969); Marshall v. Ford Motor Co., 446 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1971); Gray
v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1970); Bernal v. American Honda
Motor Co., 11 Wash. App. 903, 527 P.2d 273 (1974).
80. 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
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is undergoing the first stages of attack by reason of the court's return
to the core idea of strict liability for products. As noted earlier,8 '
the traditional distinction between a negligence and a strict liability
case is that in the latter the conduct of the manufacturer preliminary
to placing the goods on the market is technically irrelevant. Regard-
less, in design defect cases, the conduct of the manufacturer is obvi-
ously still vital on the issue of liability due to the necessity of having
some evidentiary standard in fact upon which to determine the pro-
priety of the design at issue. This is the litigation reality even
though courts downplay this obvious fact by insisting on a theoretical
construct such as "unreasonable danger" as the liability gauge.82
In such cases, until relatively recent times, admissions of evidence
of post-occurrence changes in the product under scrutiny have been
held to be reversible error. 83 The major rationale for such rulings
has been the substantial prejudice that such evidence would have
on the defendant's case and the overall chilling effect on a manufac-
turer's desire to continually improve his product. Interestingly, how-
ever, post-occurrence or contemporary design changes or alterna-
tives by manufacturers other than defendant are admissible to show
the "feasibility" of alternate design choices. 4
The judicially perceived distinction between negligence and strict
liability in the design area as noted above, has recently resulted in
several cases allowing, under various guises, post-occurrence change
evidence in a strict liability setting. This is being done on the basis
that, pursuant to the core idea of strict liability, all evidence is rele-
vant to the issue of the propriety of the defendant's design.
The decision most often cited on this point is Sutkowski v. Univer-
81. See note 60 supra.
82. See, e.g., Drummond v. General Motors Corp., 2 CCH PROD. LIABILrrY
RPTR. 5611 (Cal. Super. 1966).
83. See, e.g., Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Il1. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231
(1956); Westbrooks v. Gordon H. Ball, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 209, 56 Cal. Rptr.
422 (1967); C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 666 (2d ed.
1972).
84. See, e.g., Blohm v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1967); Pike
v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970);
Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969); Hoppe v. Midwest
Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973). See also, Noel, Manufacturer's Neg-
ligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 848-53
(1962).
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sal Marion Corp. 5 where it was held that installation by defendant of
a post-occurrence safety device on a massive strip-mining machine
was properly admitted on the issue of whether the allegedly defec-
tive product was "unreasonably dangerous." Noting the general ad-
missibility of "feasibility" evidence via proof of other manufacturers'
activities, and the shift in policy towards the safety of the product
per se under Section 402A, the court concluded:
If the feasibility of alternative designs may be shown by the opinions of
experts or by the existence of safety devices on other products or in the
design thereof we conclude that evidence of a post-occurrence change is
equally relevant and material in determining that a design alternative is
feasible.86
A more current opinion taking the majority position, Ault v. Inter-
national Harvester Co.,87 was recently decided by the California Su-
preme Court, mainly on the basis of a statutory provision in Califor-
nia's Evidence Code. Justice Mosk, dissenting, noted the absence
of sufficient case law in the area and attributed it, in effect, to insuf-
ficient emphasis being placed on the core idea of strict liability
for products:
There are remarkably few cases on the subject, perhaps because the gen-
eral law of products liability has been in a process of evolution since Jus-
tice Traynor's seminal opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.88
As regards post-occurrence change evidence, Justice Mosk con-
tinued by criticizing the basic rationale of the exclusionary rule in
light of the purpose and realities of strict liability for products:
When the context is transformed from [a] typical negligence setting to
the modern products liability field, however, the "public policy" assump-
tions justifying this evidentiary rule are no longer valid. The contempo-
rary corporate mass producer of goods, the normal products liability
defendant, manufactures tens of thousands of units of goods; it is manifestly
unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will forego making improvements
85. 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (3d Dist. 1972). The product was a
machine which was specially manufactured. Thus, because it was one of a kind, it
did not relate to an entire line of goods. However, the problem of the manufactur-
er's conduct remains the same. See also Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d
1196 (8th Cir. 1973).
86. 5 Ill. App. 3d at 319, 281 N.E.2d at 753.
87. -Cal. 3d-, 515 P.2d 313, 110 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973).
88. Id. at -, 515 P.2d at 319, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (citations omitted). As
indicators of the gradual acceptance of the Sutkowski concept under a variety of ap-
proaches see the numerous citations analyzed by Justice Mosk in his dissenting opin-
ion. Id. at -, 515 P.2d at 317-21, 110 Cal. Rptr. 373-77.
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in its product and risk innumerable additional lawsuits and attendant ad-
verse effect upon its public image, simply because evidence of adoption of
such improvement may be admitted in an action for recovery on an injury
that preceded the improvement. 89
As noted throughout this article, the process of the legal evolu-
tion of Section 402A has proceeded, pell-mell, as to the more press-
ing problems of proper party-plaintiffs, the liability of the traditional
participants in the vertical chain of distribution and the generic type
of defects cognizable under the formulation. In addition, specific
rulings on litigation-related matters were required to effect the basic
functioning of the core idea in our adversary system. The ten-year
period since the publication of Section 402A in final form accordingly
necessitated a temporary hiatus in more direct judicial analysis of
the future of the concept of strict liability for products. Contempo-
rary confusion in the field is the result of the gradual re-emergence
of the core idea, which in judicial form is straining the limits of the
language technic of Section 402A and upsetting a decade's worth
of arduousy constructed professional expectations.
Issues felt by the bar to have been settled are being continuously
re-opened by courts across the nation: the exclusion of services from
the field of strict liability,9" the top9' and bottom92 lines of the verti-
89. Id. at -, 515 P.2d at 318, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
90. See, e.g., Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Ed. Co., 38 Mich. App.
325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972), where the court, prior to upholding a verdict for the
fire that burned plaintiff's home, stated:
We see no reason why the concepts of implied warranty should depend
upon a distinction between the sale of a good and the sale of a service.
However, rather than make any sweeping generalizations by holding that
implied warranties attach to the rendering of all services, we prefer to limit
the scope of this decision to the sale of electricity. We are sure that sellers
of some services, such as here when a dangerous force is involved, should
give the warranties, while others should not. For the present, we feel that
the expansion of the law in this area should proceed on a case by case basis
at least until some general principles can be evolved.
Id. at 330, 196 N.W.2d at 318. See also Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585,
258 A.2d 697 (1969), Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 481 P.2d
924 (1971), (the germinal cases decided under the expanding "sales/service" hybrid
concept); Jerry v. Borden Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 344, 358 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1974).
91. See, e.g., Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir.
1974), where in a case involving the liability under Section 402A of defend-
ants who constructed grenades for the government pursuant to specifications, the
court stated:
Whether the manufacturer "sells" his product in the normal sense of that
word, leases it, or supplies it for a sole purchaser under contractual ar-
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cal chain of distribution, the bare minimum needed to prove a manu-
facturing defect, 93 the outside limits of the intended use concept9
rangements such as those present here, the policy considerations involving
the doctrine of strict liability remain the same.
Id. at 872. See also Lockett v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa.
1974) for exceptionally broad language regarding the supplier's duty to inform a
"user" of any danger but only in the situation where the supplier has no reason to
expect that the "user" will discover its condition and realize the danger.
92. See, e.g., Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971), an early
case which squeezed into the language technic of Section 402A the "sale" of a defec-
tive gas line fitting by a home repair contractor which caused the destruction of
plaintiff's home by fire.
As we hold that Barnes must be said to have manufactured and sold a
"product" so as to bring into operation the doctrine of strict liability, so
also must we deem this case to involve "goods" within the purview of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
Id. at 208, 484 P.2d at 576.
See also Link v. Sun Oil Co., - Ind. App. -, 312 N.E.2d 126 (1974), where
the plaintiff sought to impose strict liability on a garage owner who repaired a tire
by inserting a new tube, which exploded when plaintiff attempted to mount the
wheel. In referring to the base necessity of a sale, the court stated:
[A] sale is not necessarily an element required to establish liability under
§ 402A. The word "sells" as contained in the text of § 402A is merely
descriptive, and the product need not be actually sold if it has been injected
into the stream of commerce by other means. The test is not the sale, but
rather the placing in commerce.
Id. at -, 312 N.E.2d at 130.
93. The increasing use by analogy of the core idea of res ipsa loquitur to prove
manufacturing defects has further frustrated defense counsel. In Bombardi v. Po-
chel's Appliance & T.V. Co., 9 Wash. App. 797, 515 P.2d 540 (1973), plaintiff
sought to impose strict liability on Admiral Corporation due to a fire that started
in a used Admiral television purchased from Pochel. In response to defendant's ar-
gument that plaintiff had proven no specific defect in the set, the court noted that
it had been serviced prior to resale with Admiral parts, by Admiral trained repair-
men, according to an Admiral manual, and stated:
mhe fact that plaintiff is unable to point an accusing finger at a particu-
lar defective component does not preclude him from establishing that a
product was defective where, as in this case, the exact nature of the alleged
defect is that it is one causing the product to totally consume itself....
Id. at 801, 802, 515 P.2d at 543. The reason for the relaxed proof requirement was
stated to be the core idea of strict liability for products:
[DIespite plaintiffs' inability to identify with precision the exact one of
several potentially defective and dangerous conditions which caused the fire,
we here note that there are significant policy reasons for imposing strict
liability.
Id. at 805, 515 P.2d at 545. See also Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J.
582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974); Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., - Pa. -, 327 A.2d 94 (1974);
Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426 (1971).
94. See, e.g., Green v. Volkswagen of Amer., Inc., 485 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973).
Here, the court upset almost ten years of precedent finding no duty to so design a
vehicle as to prevent injuries occurring to parties falling against or running into a
standing vehicle. Plaintiff, an eleven year old child, caught her finger in the stand-
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and even the question of when a product is a "product." 95
In addition to this piecemeal return to the core idea of strict lia-
bility for products as noted above, reverse legal evolution is currently
surfacing as the technic for the expansion of strict liability across
vertical distribution lines to effect "enterprise liability" in the literal
sense. While the oft-heard phrases "enterprise liability" or the
"deep pocket theory" have heretofore been used as catchphrases for
the expression of the core idea of strict liability for products, there
is increasing evidence of the willingness of courts by the use of re-
ard air vent of a sixteen year old Volkswagen, standing parked, while chasing her
younger brother. In reversing a summary judgment in defendant's favor, the court
stated:
It is not beyond foreseeability for the distributor (and the manufac-
turer) to have known that this Volkswagen bus would on many occasions
be used for parking where children were playing. . . . [W]e have no
doubt that defendant in this case did owe a duty not to sell a product which
it knew (or should have known) to be defective so as to pose a hazard
to a child who came in contact with it while playing in its vicinity.
Id. at 433.
Judge Weick, dissenting, took strong note of the effect such a ruling would have
on professional expectations as to the limitation on foreseeability set by the intended
use concept:
mhe part of the majority opinion most damaging to automobile manufac-
turers and distributors is that which erroneously extends the foreseeability
doctrine to misusers of the automobile, for virtually every type of misuse
is foreseeable ...
Id. at 438 (dissenting opinion). Concluding, he stated:
While considerable progress has been made in recent years by the auto-
motive industry in the development of safety standards, no one has yet
come up with a design which would prevent injury to a person who runs
into the side of a standing vehicle.
Id. at 440 (dissenting opinion).
95. See, e.g., Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 23 IlR. App. 3d 1023, 320 N.E.2d
412 (1974). Here the court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's complaints against de-
fendant power company arising out of an injury occurring when an electrical current
arced from uninsulated power lines to a metal antenna on which plaintiff was work-
ing. In commenting on the rarely raised issue of when a product is a product, the
court stated:
Discounting those cases which have involved the transfer of possession or
use of a product for promotional or testing purposes, no case can be found
which has held a manufacturer liable in strict liability in tort for injuries
which have occurred before a product has, at least, entered its final market-
ing or merchandising stage; nor has counsel suggested that any such cases
exist.
Id. at 1028, 320 N.E.2d at 416.
While the court is correct at the moment, there are indications that this issue is
open to increased scrutiny in the near future. See, e.g., Davis v. Gibson Prod. Co.,
505 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1974); the language of Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc.,
502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974); and Lockett v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
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verse legal evolution, to throw off the shackles of doctrinal technique
and make entire industries share the loss.
At this point, a close analysis will be made of Hall v. E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours and Co.,"6 the component cases of which are currently
in litigation, 97 as an example of the use of the technique of reverse
legal evolution and as a precursor of the next possible stage in the
future evolution of the idea of strict liability for products.
VI. HALL V. DU PONT: LEGAL EVOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL
This is one of those unfortunate cases in which there certainly has been
damnum, but it is damnum absque injuria; it is no doubt, a hardship upon
the plaintiff to be without a remedy, but by that consideration we ought not
to be influenced. Hard cases it has been frequently observed, are apt to
introduce bad law.-Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 116, 152
Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842) (Rolfe, B.).
Hall v. E. 1. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,9" is the consolidation
of two suits, Hall and Chance v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,99
arising out of eighteen separate accidents across the United States
where children were injured by unidentified blasting caps. Plaintiffs
pooled their resources and brought suit against the six major manu-
facturers of blasting caps in the United States' 00 and the Institute
of Makers of Explosives (I.M.E.), the defendants' trade association.
The crucial difference between the cases was that in Chance no spe-
cific manufacturers were causally connected to the plaintiffs' injuries,
while in Hall specific defendants were linked to the injuries at is-
sue. 10' Thus the bulk of the court's analysis of enterprise liability
96. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 57 F.R.D. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) and Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), involving the resolution of con-
flict of law questions arising out of the original action.
97. Judge Weinstein's rulings in the latest decision in Chance v. E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), severed the cases of the
multiple plaintiffs and transferred them to their respective federal district courts for
trial. These trials already have or will begin in the very near future.
98. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
99. 312 F. Supp. 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) and 57 F.R.D. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
respectively.
100. The remaining defendants, which originally numbered fifteen, were DuPont,
Hercules Powder Co., Atlas Powder Co., American Cyanamid Co., Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp. and Austin Power Co. The number of original plaintiffs numbered
forty-three.
101. See notes 116-18 and accompanying text, infra.
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and the use of the technique of reverse legal evolution was had in
the Chance case. 102
Plaintiffs' theories were negligence and strict liability under Sec-
tion 402A, both anchored in defendants' failure to warn of the danger
inherent in the use of blasting caps. Judge Weinstein first addressed
the threshold issue on the negligence count, that of duty, in response
to defendants' motion to dismiss.
In a clear and scholarly manner, after citing and discussing vir-
tually every authority in the negligence field, Judge Weinstein essen-
tially utilized the basic triparte calculus of Judge Learned Hand in
his famous decision in United States v. Caroll Towing Co.,10' which
balances the factors of the foreseeability of the risk against both the
severity of the harm if it materializes and the burden of precaution
on the defendant to have avoided the risk. In regard to foresee-
ability, Judge Weinstein noted:
Whatever the verbal formulation, the concept of "foreseeable risk" is
universally taken to mean the foreseeability of a general kind or type of
risk, rather than the foreseeability of the precise chain of events leading to
the particular injury in question.10 4
This formulation of the nature of the foreseeability doctrine, upon
which there is still substantial disagreement, 15 was vital to the deci-
sion due to the overwhelming evidence of foreseeability in fact of
the type of injuries at issue resulting from the information gathering
and pooling functions of the I.M.E. In response to defendants' posi-
tion that even in a negligence case the concept of intended use sets
a legal limit on product related risks even if foreseen in fact, Judge
Weinstein returned to the core idea of foreseeability, under negli-
gence law, while admitting the general usefulness of the products-
related limitation:
Despite the general validity of the intended use principle, it does not
warrant a conclusion that the blasting cap manufacturers in this case had no
102. In Chance, thirteen children, residing in ten different states were injured in
twelve unrelated accidents. 57 F.R.D. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
103. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1949).
104. 345 F. Supp. at 362.
105. See Turkington, Foreseeability and Duty Issues in Illinois Torts; Constitu-
tional Limitations to Defamation Suits Under Gertz, supra note 73, and the cases
cited therein.
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duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff-children. The doctrine of intended
use is an illustration of the broader doctrine of foreseeability.
106
As will be seen, this was the first of several key analyses made
by the court which illustrates both the continuing vitality of the com-
mon law system as well as the use of the concept of reverse legal
evolution in a "Grand Style" context. Legal rules must not be seen
as absolutes but as professional verbalizations of sound ideas whose
functional evolution and continual use over the years have provided
consistent practicality and justice in most instances where their use
is appropriate. This leaves room for a return to core ideas as gen-
eral support for the resolution of novel problems. It is the effect
that such an approach has on counsel that has been the theme of
this Article.
The core idea that certain obvious risks to children which are tech-
nically unrelated to the proper use of an instrumentality nevertheless
merit attention by the possessor, was found to have continued via-
bility once the analysis cuts through the crust of language technic
built up over the past decade in the products field:
Application of general principles of foreseeability and reasonable care to
unintended uses is not peculiar to modern products liability cases. A simi-
lar approach can be found in numerous cases decided in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries involving children playing with railroad turn-
tables, dynamite blasting caps and other dangerous instruments and ma-
chines . ..
The doctrines evolved in these cases are now embodied in section 339 of
the Second Restatement of Torts. 0 7
Accordingly, in light of the substantial indication of defendants'
knowledge of the risks to children, a duty of due care was found
to exist. The severity and burden of precaution aspects of Judge
Learned Hand's calculus, the latter being translated into questions
of costs and social utility, were given brief discussion and found not
to outweigh the deciding factor of foreseeability in the duty analy-
sis. 10
Moving to the more difficult strict liability count, Judge Weinstein
again addressed the duty to warn issue as it is affected by the tradi-
tional view regarding a defendant manufacturer's conduct which is
106. 345 F. Supp. at 363 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 366.
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technically irrelevant under Section 402A.10 9 Noting the lack of any
sharp boundary between the use of the idea of foreseeability as a
liability criterion in negligence and strict liability cases, Judge Wein-
stein, in a statement reminiscent of Chief Justice Shaw's decision in
Brown v. Kendall" ° found the requisite duty here as well:
Reduction of the threshold probability required before a defendant-manu-
facturer can be held liable in either negligence or strict liability has resulted
from the abandonment of rigid categorical judgments about what kinds of
uses and users are foreseeable, and from an increased willingness to submit
such issues to juries where the determination "depends on policy values un-
derlying the common affairs of life.""'
The next crucial issue, that of joint liability, is perhaps the most
apt example in the decision of how the return to the core idea of
a legal rule can cause counsel to rail against its potential applicability
in a unique setting. Judge Weinstein began his lengthy analysis of
this issue with a clear statement of the idea of reverse legal evolu-
tion.
Joint tort liability is not limited to a narrow set of relationships and cir-
cumstances. It has been imposed in a wide range of situations, requiring
varying standards of care, in which defendants cooperate in various degrees,
enter into business and property relationships, and undertake to supply
goods for public consumption. Developments in negligence and strict tort
liability have imposed extensive duties on manufacturers to guard against
a broad spectrum of risks with regard to the general population. The rea-
soning underlying current policy justifies the extension of established doc-
trines of joint tort liability in the area of industry-wide cooperation in
product manufacture and design.112
The idea that under certain appropriate circumstances a group
might have to respond in damages for injuries caused by less than
all the members is an idea that has been utilized throughout the
history of the common law.
Even in its earliest form the doctrine of joint liability for concerted action
contained all the elements necessary for its future development: (1) caus-
ing harm (2) by cooperative or concerted activities (3) which violated a
legal standard of care. 1.13
The "fact-type settings," to use Llewellyn's expression, were admit-
tedly far removed from the facts at bar, i.e., assaults, reckless driving,
109. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
110. 60 Mass. (6Cush.) 292 (1850).
111. 345 F. Supp. at 369.
112. Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
113. Id.
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water pollution, collapsed commonly-owned wall, racing horses, and
railroads burning brush. However, the core idea was readily appli-
cable to defendants in light of their cooperative or parallel activities
regarding the safety features of blasting caps via their trade associa-
tion.114
In addition to the existent common law idea regarding joint con-
trol of risk as a functional technique to bind defendants together,
the same idea in an even broader and more current form could be
expressed in terms of the new separate legal concept of "enterprise
liability." Workmen's compensation structures, the law of respon-
deat superior, ultrahazardous activities, and more specific settings
wherein a non-delegable duty of a business has been explicitly
stated, all provide a wealth of underlying core ideas with which to
construct a legal expression of the modem idea.
While the idea of enterprise liability in fact was applicable to the
facts at bar, the court was cautious in its statement regarding the
use of the new idea in the future.
To establish that the explosives industry should be held jointly liable on
enterprise liability grounds, plaintiffs, pursuant to their pleading, will have
to demonstrate defendants' joint awareness of the risks at issue in this case
and their joint capacity to reduce or affect those risks. By noting these re-
quirements we wish to emphasize their special applicability to industries
composed of a small number of units. What would be fair and feasible
with regard to an industry of five or ten producers might be manifestly
unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands
of small producers." 1 5
The final major hurdle to overcome was the issue of cause-in-fact.
Defendants contended that plaintiffs' failure to plead causal relation
as to all or one of their groups required a dismissal of the complaint.
This was especially so in light of the fact that not all blasting cap
114. Judge Weinstein made a lengthy analysis of the overall idea of joint control
of risk and distinguished it from the more specific requisites of the theories of joint
enterprise and joint venture. Id. at 371. For more traditional and detailed discus-
sions of this aspect of the case, see, Note, Products Liability-Enterprise Liability-
Entire Industry May Be Liable If Impossible To Identify Actual Manufacturer of De-
fective Product, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1299 (1973); Note, Recent Developments in Joint
& Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1319, 1325-33 (1973); Note, Torts--Joint
Liability-Joint Liability May Be Imposed Upon All Members of an Industry and
Their Trade Association for Injury Caused by Defective Product Design if the Entire
Industry Cooperated in Creating the Design and the Specific Manufacturer of the
Injury-Causing Product Cannot Be Identified, 42 CINN. L. REV. 341 (1973).
115. 345 F. Supp. at 378.
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manufacturers remained in the suit. While proof of causal relation
has generally been deemed a sine qua non of recovery due to its
obvious justice, that conclusion, as with most other legal rules, is not
an absolute.
The cause-in-fact doctrine must and has given way in the past in
cases where its use would impede justice in the face of other equally
probative factors regarding the presence of responsibility. After ana-
lyzing the line of decisions flowing from the famous case of Summers
v. Tice' 6 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 433B,I"
the court concluded:
The possibility-admitted by plaintiffs-that the caps may have come
from other, unnamed sources, does not affect plaintiffs' burden of proof.
Plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of the evidence-i.e., that it is
more probable than not-that the caps involved in the accidents were the
products of the named defendant-manufacturers. Plaintiffs do not have
to identify which one of the defendant-manufacturers made each injury-
causing cap. To impose such a requirement would obviate the entire rule
of shifting the burden of proving causation to the defendants. It must be
more probable than not that an injury was caused by a cap made by some
one of the named defendant manufacturers, though which one is un-
known."1 8
The foregoing highly selective analysis of Judge Weinstein's
groundbreaking decision in the Chance case' 19 is a prime example
of the position asserted in this article: that courts, by returning
to the core idea of strict liability for products, have created consider-
able confusion among the bar due to their utilization of the language
technic of Section 402A as the functional means of expression. This
piecemeal assault on a decade of carefully garnered professional ex-
pectations as to the impact of Section 402A, 120 now that the more
116. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965).
118. 345 F. Supp. at 379. In the companion case, Hall, since three groups of
plaintiffs named two manufacturers, their actions against the others based on enter-
prise liability were dismissed on the basis of the "absence of any demonstrable need
for joint liability in administrative or remedial terms...." Id. at 386. The will-
ingness to creatively utilize existing legal theory by the use of reverse legal evolution
in the products field will be hampered in the foreseeable future by the traditional
non-product related factors associated with the common law litigation structure,
which comprise the existing "reckonability" base of the bar.
119. One of the defense counsels on the case described, in a conversation with
the author, the result and technique used by Judge Weinstein to definitely be the
law in eight to ten years.
120. One of the author's students aptly expressed the quandry by observing that
defense attorneys "know the words but haven't got the music."
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pressing issues have been settled to make the section functional, will
continue. However, direct frontal assaults by way of returning to
the large pool of doctrine underlying the plethora of specific tort
rules are increasing in number. To date, Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co. 2' stands alone, given the factual basis of the deci-
sion. However, several recent decisions holding multiple companies
in one industry liable on similar reasoning 122 indicate which way the
wind is blowing.
VII. CONCLUSION
Nothing was adduced which is not common knowledge; yet it seems to
me that the rather careful gathering and stating of so much pertinent com-
mon knowledge, all in order, can hardly fail to rekindle faith.-Karl Llewel-
lyn, The Common Law Tradition 520 (1960).
The task of bringing into full flower the seeds planted by Justice
Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba Power Co.,123 has been limited by
the language technic of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. However, the process of reverse legal evolution has ini-
tiated a return to the core idea of strict liability for products articu-
lated in Greenman, a process which is becoming more obvious each
time one reads an advance sheet. These current attempts to move
forward with the core idea while keeping the language technic of
Section 402A are or will have obvious negative effects on profes-
sional expectations.
Courts are not likely to abandon the language technic of Section
402A, nor is the practicing bar likely to readily shed ten years of
professional expectations as to its use resulting from the digestion
of a dearth of cases addressing virtually every aspect of products lia-
bility litigation. In the author's view, an all-encompassing approach
would be either a reformulation of Section 402A or the creation and
gradual refinement of a new language tool more fittingly drafted to
reflect the broad-based nature of much of the recent case law. In
121. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
122. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), holding six major asbestos insulation manufacturers responsible for the death
of an asbestos worker who contracted asbestosis following a thirty-three-year ex-
posure to the products of each defendant. As in Chance, the issue was failure to
warn.
123. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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the meantime, a simple realization of the "neglected obvious" in this
field in light of Llewellyn's observations on the "Grand Style" model
of adjudication, may clarify the problem and lead to a more rapid
resolution of the "crisis of confidence" in the products liability
area.
The Restatement is no more an absolute in language terms than
is any rule of common law. Herbert F. Goodrich, a strong supporter
of the concept of a restatement of the law, insisted on this idea in
the face of intense criticism from Leon Green and other realist au-
thors over the years. Goodrich stated:
It was always said by those responsible for the Restatement that all they
hoped to do was to give the profession the correct rules up to time of pub-
lication. The Restatement said 'This far." It did not say "This far and no
farther." And courts, whose members really do have a fair amount of com-
mon sense, have not felt there was any implication of "no farther" either.
Places where the law is alive and rules are developing continue to abound
in new growth. That is as it should be. Examination of the course of re-
cent decisions shows that what should be and what is are the same; a rare
phenomenon in an imperfect world. The Restatement provides the fertile
field for new growth; it does not impede it.124
The comfort of familiar language and the natural professional as-
sumption of a modicum of stability once an idea has evolved to its
functional limits detract from what Professor Goodrich saw as obvi-
ous. This is especially so in the products liability field, where the
professional settling-in process regarding the scope of Section 402A
has barely concluded. The advice given lawyers by Karl Llewellyn
fifteen years ago in The Common Law Tradition as a means of
getting hold of a development that took nearly a century to surface,
should perhaps be taken by those involved in the fast-paced world
of products liability litigation.
His continual urging of lawyers to "see it fresh," "see it clean"
and "come back to make sure"'125 contained the essence of realism
which he always insisted was simply a technique to describe the
functional operation of any institution, including the courts. The
"neglected obvious" was both the professional's and the law's life
blood:
124. H.F. Goodrich, Restatement and Codification, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CEN-
TENARY ESSAYS 241, 248 (1949).
125. THE COMMON LAW TRADIToN, supra note 9, at 510.
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[T]he material has always been there to see....
If noticed, if taken to heart, it may help to bring back into blossom and
fruit Lemuel Shaw's noble dream of American law and decision made plain,
made warm and near, made proud, to the men and women from whom and
for whom they are. 126
A fresh look at the philosophy of strict liability for products and the
language technic for effecting it can clear the air in this most active
area of American law.' 27
126. Id. at 520.
127. For the fact is that the work of our appellate courts all over the
country is reckonable. It is reckonable first, and on a relative scale, far be-
yond what any sane man has any business expecting -from a machinery de-
voted to settling disputes self-selected for their toughness. It is reckonable
second, and on an absolute scale, quite sufficiently for skilled craftsmen to
make usable and valuable judgments about likelihoods, and quite suffi-
ciently to render the handling of an appeal a fitting subject for effective
and satisfying craftsmanship.
Id. at 4.
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